Abstract
Introduction
Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) [1] protocol supports the mobility of IPv6 nodes by extending the signal between mobile node (MN) and home agent (HA) based on mobile IPv6 [2] protocol. The mobile agents in PMIPv6 network handle the signal interaction between MN and HA, and participates in the mobility management on behalf of MN. Since it is not necessary for PMIPv6 to do extra configuration for MN, PMIPv6 thus becomes an important mobility supporting protocol in next generation networks. The open nature and lack of security considerations brings potential risk for PMIpv6 during its deployment. Mutual access authentication between MN and proxy mobile entities is mandatory when MN gets access to the foreign network. The mutual access authentication is a fundamental requirement for the security of PMIPv6. In addition, since handover and authentication often occur simultaneously, authentication operations should be synchronized with handover, to ensure the real-time application and handover efficiency.
In the literature research of PMIPv6 access authentication, [3] proposed a PMIPv6 authentication scheme based on Diameter protocol. Access authentication is achieved by presharing the key of AAA server, MN, and mobile agent entity, which increases delay between the AAA server and the proxy mobile entity. [4] solves the key management security issue in the wireless environment by adopting certificate-less sign cryption mechanism in the authentication process of PMIPv6, but this method incurs heavy load on the AAA server due to the interaction between key negotiation process and the AAA server [5] gives a better way to optimize the authentication efficiency of proxy mobile entity handover, it increases the communication cost due to long distance and communication delay among proxy mobile
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Proxy MIPv6
Figure 1. Network Architecture of PMIPv6
As shown by Figure 1 , two new functional entities are introduced in the PMIPv6: Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) and Mobile Access Gateway (MAG). LMA is equivalent to the home agent in mobile IPv6. Since LMA extends the functions of the home agent, it becomes the topological anchor node of the MN's home network prefix and manages the state of the MN's binding. MAG is implemented on the access router. MAG participates in mobility management on behalf of MN, so that MN can acquire mobility support without any configuration from mobility management protocol.
When MN accessing the PMIPv6 domain, MAG gets MN configuration file first. This configuration file contains the user identity, the LMA address that provides services. Then MAG sends the Proxy Binding Update (PBU) message to the designated LMA on the behalf on MN. Once LMA receives PBU, it feedbacks the Proxy Binding Acknowledge (PBA) message containing the MN's Home Network Prefix (HNP) meanwhile generates a binding cache (BCE) for storing the registration information of accessing MN. After MAG receives PBA, it establishes a bi-directional tunnel between itself and LMA, through which MAG sends announcement messages to MN to inform the prefix of MN home network. MN is able to configure a global IPv6 address based on that prefix. Finally, MN establishes the communication with its correspondent node (CN) by the bi-directional tunnel between the MAG and the LMA.
Bilinear Pairings
Let G 1 and G 2 be an addition cyclic group and a multiplicative cyclic group with an order of prime q respectively. We call ê a bilinear pairing, if the mapping ê：G 1 ╳ G 1 →G 2 satisfies the following properties [6] ： • Bilinearity：For any P，Q∈G 1 and a，b∈Z q * ，we have ê(aP,bQ)= ê(P,Q) ab .
• Non-degeneracy：There exists P, Q∈G 1 , such that ê(P,Q)≠I G2 , where I G2 is the generator of G 2 .
• Computability ：For any P, Q ∈ G 1 , there exists an algorithm that calculates ê(P,Q) .
In modern cryptography, by using bilinear paring, we can construct many security mechanisms which cannot be implemented by other mathematical methods, such as the Tate Pairing and the Weil Pairing over elliptic.
Access Authentication Scheme Based on 2-HIBS
2-HIBS Scheme
In order to adapt to the network structure of PMIPv6, in this paper, we construct a new 2-HIBS scheme by incorporating the HIBS mechanism [7] . Our 2-HIBS scheme consists of five algorithms: Root-PKG Setup, Level-1-PKG Extract, Level-2-PKG Extract, Sign and Verify .Two levels of users are involved. The first level user's identity is ID 1 = (I 1 ) and the second level user's identity is ID 2 =(I 1 ，I 2 ), where I 1 , I 2 ∈ {0,1} * . The detail of 2-HIBS scheme is described as below: • Root-PKG Setup Root-PKG generates cyclic group G and G T with the prime order q based on the security parameter k, and bi-linear pairings ê: G╳G→G T 
Network Architecture
As shown in Figure 2 , 3-level network architecture is designed for PMIPv6. The first level consists of Trust Third Party (TTP) acting as the root PKG. TTP is responsible for generating the system parameters and the private key for level-1 PKG. According to MN affiliation, PMIPv6 domain is divided into the Home Domain and Foreign Domain. HLMA is the authentication server in the home domain, while FLMA is the authentication server in the foreign domain. The second level consists of FLMA and HLMA, i.e., level-1 PKG. The third level is composed of MAG and MN. When MN roaming and accessing a foreign domain. Access authentication is invoked. In this paper, our 2-HIBS scheme achieves localized mutual authentication for MN, which greatly improves the efficiency of access authentication. 
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To simplify the description of the follow-up scheme, related operations and instructions are presented by Table 1 . 
System Initialization
We make assumptions first for the various functional entities in the network architecture as follows:
• All entities support 2-HIBS mechanism in the network architecture; • A secure channel has been established in advance between MAG and FLMA (HLMA) ;
• The format of configuration information of MN (MN Info ) is shown as Table 2 ; • To resist replay attack, the entire signature must include the current timestamp. The system is initialized with the help of 2-HIBS mechanism:
• Root-PKG generates system parameters param = (G, G T , ê, g, g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , U, H 1 ), and distribute private keys according to identity information of level -1 PKG ;
• Level-1 PKG assigns private keys based on identity information of level -2 user.
Mutual Authentication Protocol
While MN leaving home domain and accessing to MAG 1 of foreign domain, the mutual authentication is triggered. The specific steps are shown in Figure 3 .
• 
Security Analysis
We analysis the security of our proposed scheme in three aspects [8] : private key confidentiality, signatures unforgeability and key escrow free.
• ID2 . In summary, the private key of any entity is only known by his father entity rather than other entities.
• Signatures unforgeability Adversary may forge 2-HIBS signatures in two different ways: The first is replay attack through collecting used signatures. The second is trying to break 2 -HIBS itself to achieve the purpose of forgery. First, the proposed mutual authentication protocol introduces is in the message signature. Verifier can determine the validity of the signature by checking freshness of TS to effectively prevent replay attacks. Second, 2 -HIBS scheme adopts l-HIBS scheme as building block proved l-HIBS scheme secure under l-DHI difficulties assumption so that chosen identity attack and chosen message attack are not effective. Therefore adversary cannot forge signature by breaking 2 -HIBS scheme.
• Key escrow free It has been analyzed in the private key confidentiality that level -2 user's private key is only known by himself and his father (HLMA), any other entity is unable to get the private key. Thus in a wireless mobile environment, when MN accessing a foreign domain, any entity in foreign domain cannot impersonate MN to finish access authentication or monitor encrypted communication of MN. Thus within foreign domain, 2-HIBS scheme is key escrow free. As for the key escrow problem between HLMA and MN, it can be solved by combing 2-HIBS and CBS, which will be a main task of our future work.
Conclusions
In this paper, we propose a new access authentication scheme for PMIPv6 based on 2-HIBS mechanism, then analysis the security. By results of analysis this scheme satisfy security requirement of three aspects: private key confidentiality, signatures unforgeability and key escrow.
In the further task, we will do a detailed performance analysis and compare the time with the other scheme.
